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Abstract 
At present, very little is known about what might encourage children and teens to limit access to their private information online 
and to restrict what they share on social media and video sites. Federal and state agencies face challenges encouraging companies 
to help children, teens, and parents protect their information online. The authors extend previous cognitive defense research by 
examining (1) effects beyond advertising as applied to information privacy online; (2) not only children’s/teens’ beliefs and 
knowledge, but also their online privacy decisions; (3) multiple age categories; (4) multiple cognitive defense strategies (educa-
tional video, quiz with feedback, or absence of a strategy); and (5) children’s/teens’ motivation to restrict what they share online. 
Key results indicate significant effects of the quiz and educational video over the absence of a strategy in enhancing favorable 
online safety beliefs and in restricting online sharing. Findings also demonstrate the role of perceived parental influence and for 
agencies to offer privacy education campaigns to help empower children to protect their privacy. Implications for policy and 
privacy research are discussed. 
Keywords 
children, privacy, cognitive defenses, active protection, (self) regulation 
Children and Teens Online: A Privacy 
Problem 
Currently, 95% of teens have access to a smartphone, and 45% 
report that they are online “almost constantly” (Pew Research 
Center 2018). Children’s and teens’ online use has reached 
record highs, with youth aged 5–15 years spending over 15 
hours each week online—overtaking time spent watching tra-
ditional TV (Ofcom 2017). Even preschoolers, aged 3–4 years, 
are spending almost eight hours per week online. Parents also 
are spending a great deal of time online, and some admit that 
they also struggle with the allure of screens and are increas-
ingly distracted by their devices (Pew Research Center 2018). 
Given this almost incessant online activity for many, several 
questions and challenges emerge. Are children, teens, and par-
ents protecting their online data themselves, and if so, how are 
they protecting their personal information during online 
exchanges? If they are not protecting their online information, 
who is or who should? Are there ways to empower children and 
teens regarding their online safety knowledge and behaviors? Is 
it better to have children learn online safety themselves or have 
parents enforce safety measures? We examine these issues 
experimentally by testing whether certain cognitive defense 
strategies (e.g., an educational video, a quiz with feedback) 
versus an absence of a strategy will help children and teens 
improve (1) their beliefs about online safety and (2) their deci-
sions to restrict the sharing of videos online. Our focus is on 
one of the most popular social media sites for children and 
teens today: YouTube. Our contribution extends prior research 
on the use of cognitive defense strategies (cf. Brucks, Arm-
strong, and Goldberg 1988; John 1999; Rozendaal, Buijzen, 
and Valkenburg 2009) by focusing on information privacy 
(vs. advertising) and by our testing of specific online safety 
beliefs and decisions, multiple age categories, and multiple 
defense strategies, as well as accounting for children’s and 
teens’ motivation to restrict access and sharing. We also exam-
ine whether children’s and teens’ perceived parental 
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restrictions on their online viewing and sharing vary by age. 
Understanding this process of empowerment can help federal 
and state agencies and marketers improve regulatory efforts to 
better protect the online privacy of children and teens. 
Children’s Online Behavior, YouTube, and 
Company Responses 
The privacy of children and teens, and the information col-
lected from them online, represents one of parents’ top con-
cerns today (Anderson 2019). There is good reason for this 
concern, as across all social network profiles, only 61% of 
youth aged 10–18 years have enabled the privacy settings to 
protect their content, and 52% do not turn off their location or 
GPS services across apps, leaving their locations visible to 
others (McAfee 2014). In addition, 14% posted their home 
addresses online—a 27% increase from the previous year’s 
results. Even with the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (FTC 1998 and 
updates), a study of online children’s apps showed that more 
than 50% of the apps failed to protect the children’s data (Egel-
man 2017). Recently, operators of the children’s app Musi-
cal.ly (also known as Tik Tok) agreed to pay $5.7 million to 
settle FTC charges that they violated the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Rule by collecting personally identifiable 
information from children through the app (U.S. v. Musical.ly 
and Musical.ly, Inc. 2019). Also, gaming chat apps (e.g., Dis-
cord) have been singled out for their lack of age verification 
and violent messaging and content from users aimed at children 
and teens (Jargon 2019). Finally, Google’s YouTube agreed to 
a $170 million settlement with the FTC and New York Attor-
ney General based on a complaint that YouTube collected 
personal information from children for use in behavioral adver-
tising delivered to viewers of children’s channels on YouTube 
(FTC 2019; U.S. and New York Attorney General 2019). 
YouTube represents the most popular site for children and 
teens to view video content, with 73% of those aged 5–15 using 
the site (Ofcom 2017) and an even higher percentage for teens 
in general at 85% (Pew Research Center 2018). Google’s 
YouTube is of particular interest for research about children 
and privacy because it offers two different sites with different 
target segments. One is considered a “general site” and is 
directed toward consumers over the age of 13, whereas the 
other site, YouTube Kids, was introduced in 2015 for children 
preschool age and older. In 2018, a coalition of consumer 
advocacy groups complained that YouTube has known that 
children aged 12 and  younger  access the general site (instead 
of YouTube Kids), accusing YouTube of violating the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (COPPA 
1998). As previously noted, this resulted in Google’s 
YouTube settling with the FTC and New York Attorney 
General for the largest COPPA penalty since Congress 
enacted the  law in 1998 (FTC  2019).  
Although parents claim they check what their teens and 
children do online and post on social media (Anderson 
2019), recent reviews of the most popular video websites 
(e.g., YouTube) indicate that child protection mechanisms are 
breaking down (Wendling 2017). For example, YouTube’s 
volunteer “Trusted Flaggers1” report that of 526 complaints 
made to YouTube’s public reporting abuse page, only 15 
responses were received back from the service (Wendling 
2017). The reports were made primarily against accounts that 
left objectionable comments (often sexually explicit) on videos 
made by young teenagers and children. As a result, YouTube 
promised to increase its transparency with users about how it 
flags videos and handles reports about flagged videos. The first 
“Community Guidelines Enforcement Report,” covering the 
last quarter of 2017, indicates that the general site (i.e., not 
YouTube Kids) removed approximately 8.2 million videos dur-
ing that period (Shu 2018). Some consumer advocacy groups 
have noted that although “YouTube Kids may be more ‘kid-
friendly’ than YouTube itself,” the site is “still technically a 
portal to the main YouTube service,” which contains a consid-
erable amount of questionable content (Common Sense Media 
2018). In essence, privacy protection (i.e., control and access to 
personal information) is still primarily the responsibility of 
parents and the children themselves. Empowering children to 
set limits for their online interactions is a key factor, especially 
for those on YouTube. Our study contributes to these areas by 
examining what types of cognitive defense strategies can be 
effective at improving online safety beliefs for children and 
teens and, in turn, helping them to restrict the sharing of private 
information. 
Regulatory Efforts in Protecting Children’s 
Online Privacy 
Since 1997, the Federal Trade Commission (1997) and industry 
self-regulatory guidelines for children (Children’s Advertising 
Review Unit (CARU) 1997), have recommended providing (1) 
full and effective notice or disclosure (e.g., regarding the infor-
mation collected, how it will be used, information access), (2) 
parental or guardian consent, (3) parental or guardian choice 
(access) with respect to the information collected, and (4) 
future privacy protection (security) for children. These four 
privacy principles are now enforced as part of the FTC’s Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (FTC 1998; emanating 
from the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act or 
“COPPA” 1998), which applies to any website collecting data 
from children under age 13 in the United States. COPPA offers 
guidelines for websites targeting children to ensure parental 
consent for children aged 13 and under; however, a loophole 
exists for websites that target general audiences, which chil-
dren may still access. California recently addressed this loop-
hole with The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (AB 
375), which extends the protection to children/teens under age 
1 “YouTube Trusted Flagger program was developed by YouTube to help 
provide robust tools for individuals, government agencies, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are particularly effective at 
notifying YouTube of content that violates [the] Community Guidelines.” 
(support.google.com). 
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16 and requires prior parental permission for sites to collect 
children’s data. Either way, this type of regulation and legisla-
tion focuses on protecting the data gathered and advertising 
delivered to users on websites targeting children, rather than 
constraining the amount of data gathered. This represents an 
important distinction affecting the ability of parents and chil-
dren to protect their exchanged information. 
Since COPPA (1998, with 2012 amendments included) and 
AB 375, there have been privacy workshops and conferences 
(PrivacyCon) almost every year at the FTC centered on these 
issues (e.g., “Putting (Privacy) Disclosures to the Test,” FTC 
2016). Although these privacy principles, workshops, and con-
ferences are intuitively appealing, very little research has been 
conducted to examine how children and teens actually respond 
to privacy disclosure information and education.2 This is a 
significant gap in research, as children and parents are increas-
ingly relying on devices and online connections to give them 
the power to accomplish tasks and assist with daily responsi-
bilities. Thus, important questions remain regarding how chil-
dren store, retrieve, and make choices regarding their online 
information (e.g., parental permission), warning information 
(e.g., not to post full names, phone numbers, email addresses), 
and restrictions to content posted. In this study, we examine 
experimentally whether cognitive defense strategies (e.g., an 
educational video, a quiz with feedback) will positively influ-
ence children’s online privacy knowledge and willingness to 
place conditions on what they might share and whether they 
restrict access to videos watched. First, we discuss research on 
what motivates children’s and teens’ (online) decision making 
and why they often resort to risk taking. Then, we present 
efforts to help reduce such (online) risk taking, such as the 
active setting of privacy controls through cognitive defense 
strategies. 
Children’s and Teens’ (Online) Decision 
Making 
Research has shown that children and adolescents (aged 13–17 
years) are more impulsive, self-conscious, prone to risk taking, 
and more vulnerable to harm than adults (Pechmann et al. 
2005; Steinberg 2020). A primary reason for this is the rapid 
development and plasticity of the brain in these formative years 
(Pechmann et al. 2005). The release of dopamine plays an 
important role in adolescent neural activity in response to novel 
stimuli and rewards (e.g., social media postings, comments and 
likes, text pings, Twitter bird whistles). As such, adolescent 
choices are driven more by rewards during this period than 
by an evaluation of risks (Steinberg and Scott 2003). For exam-
ple, research has shown that adolescents (aged 13–17) have 
significantly higher intentions to take online risks (e.g., disclos-
ing personal information, making unknown friends online) than 
2 Research on children also can be challenging because they are considered a 
specially protected group (i.e., academic research requires approval from an 
institutional review board). 
young adults (aged 18–24) (White et al. 2015). One reason for 
this is that the prefrontal cortex, important for inhibitory con-
trol and objective risk assessment, is not fully developed until 
late adolescence. Moreover, the skills required to control urges 
found in adolescence are not developed until later—often lead-
ing to risky decisions (Pechmann et al. 2005). 
Fitting in socially is an additional pressure that children and 
adolescents often face online. Peer influence, often manifested 
through social media, is at its strongest in early adolescence 
and only slowly declines in high school (Steinberg and Scott 
2003). Due to this period of impulsivity, sensation seeking, 
self-consciousness, and peer influence, adolescents are partic-
ularly vulnerable to making poor decisions, leading to an ele-
vated risk of addiction (e.g., social media) and other abuses 
(Andrews and Netemeyer 2015; Pechmann et al. 2005). Ado-
lescents also are shown to be more susceptible to advertising 
imagery and consumption symbols for harmful products (cf. 
Pechmann and Knight 2002; Pollay et al. 1996). Ideally, the 
development of one’s knowledge of advertising tactics and 
appeals (i.e., persuasion knowledge; Friestad and Wright 
1994) can help reduce such susceptibility. However, as noted 
by Friestad and Wright (1994), such persuasion knowledge, 
involving more abstract, skeptical, multidimensional, and less 
absolute thinking, only begins to form in adolescence and 
develops slowly. Also, in the study of adolescent online risk 
taking, White et al. (2015) find that verbatim (absolute) repre-
sentations correlate positively with online risk intentions, 
whereas gist (meaning) representations correlate negatively 
with such online risk intentions. So, how is such online knowl-
edge and meaning developed by children and adolescents? The 
answer may lie in the development and activation of privacy 
protection (Walker 2016), digital/media literacy (Hobbs 2011; 
Pechmann et al. 2005), and/or cognitive defense strategies 
(Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg 1988) to empower children 
and adolescents online. 
Active Versus Passive Privacy Protection 
Efforts to encourage active (vs. passive) privacy protection by 
educating parents and children about privacy issues have 
become more prominent recently. As such, privacy education 
is encouraged strongly by industry and public policy to achieve 
what is considered “digital literacy” (Hobbs 2011). Digital 
literacy involves not only the ability (for youth) to understand 
the risks involved when providing information online but also 
to understand immediate dangers involving other people, such 
as cyberbullying, stranger danger, etc. COPPA is an attempt to 
address the general issue of the collection and use of informa-
tion by websites, apps, and platforms. But, as discussed previ-
ously, COPPA is limited to children under age 13 (16 and under 
in California) and only requires sites to obtain parental permis-
sion to gather data. Industry efforts tend to focus on complying 
with COPPA and ensuring websites avoid collecting personal 
information and engaging in online behavioral advertising 
when such sites have “actual knowledge” that users are under 
the age of 13 (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2015, p. 5). The 
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Figure 1. Consumer information privacy: The sharing–surrendering 
information matrix. Source: Walker (2016). 
purpose of improving one’s digital literacy is to strengthen the 
competence and understanding of digital knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes, including the protection of personal information 
exchanged. Using strategies to strengthen children’s cognitive 
defenses supports digital literacy efforts to help them protect 
their privacy online. 
To aid in research and discussion on active privacy protec-
tion, Walker (2016) portrays the uncertainty about the 
exchange of information and the levels of privacy protection 
in a 2  2 matrix of sharing–surrendering information (SSIM; 
see Figure 1). In the SSIM, privacy protection levels are dis-
played along a continuum of active or passive based on how 
many conditions individuals use, place, enact, etc. when 
exchanging information. An individual who is active in their 
privacy protection may place conditions on their exchanges by 
using privacy settings, employing different email accounts for 
app use, viewing online content with private mode(s), etc. 
When an individual is passive in their protection and does not 
place conditions on their online exchanges of information, they 
are unconditionally exchanging information. 
As an example of passive protection and unconditional shar-
ing, consider the situation in which a child/teen downloads a 
new app on a smartphone and quickly checks the privacy terms 
box assuming there is no harm from the app’s collection of 
information. Unfortunately, improving the ability of individu-
als to process and actively protect privacy often has been rele-
gated to the assumed reading of privacy policy disclosure 
notices. But such notices are widely criticized as being any-
thing but “clear and conspicuous,” as they often appear in small 
type size, are lengthy, are not clearly written, and at times are 
not presented with the target audience in mind (e.g., children, 
older consumers) (Hoy and Andrews 2004). So, how can agen-
cies improve the digital literacy, readability, and processing of 
important online privacy information, especially with children 
and teens in mind? Some studies have pointed to the superiority 
of dual modality—the simultaneous presentation of a message 
in audio and video—in affecting awareness, comprehension, 
knowledge acquisition, and recall of information (cf. Hoy and 
Andrews 2004). This superiority assumes that dual modality 
enhances one’s depth of message processing in contrast to a 
single mode of presentation (i.e., either solely in audio/written 
form or only in video form; Paivio 1969). But, again, dual 
modality is still only an enhancement in a condition of passive 
(vs. active) privacy protection. 
Overall, the SSIM extends the level of protection beyond 
passive and acknowledges a difference in how much people 
trust their online interactions. Yet, in our study, we focus on 
how to activate cognitive defense strategies in children that will 
encourage them to place conditions on their exchanges of infor-
mation in the hope that they will become active in their privacy 
protection. 
Cognitive Defense Strategies to Improve 
Privacy Knowledge and Decisions 
As originally conceived, children who can understand the 
selling intent of advertising are said to have developed 
“cognitive defenses” (Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg 
1988; Rossiter and Robertson 1974). However, as aptly noted 
by Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg (1988) and John (1999), 
simply understanding the general selling intent of advertising 
is not sufficient for being able to resist specific persuasive 
appeals. For example, “general knowledge and beliefs about 
advertising cannot be expected to dampen a child’s enthusi-
asm for an enticing snack or toy” (John 1999, p. 190). As 
applied to our study, general knowledge about the privacy 
of information may not lessen a child’s or teen’s desire to 
download the latest app and/or quickly share personal infor-
mation online. The cognitive defense needs to be specifically 
applied to sharing decisions that children or teens make. In 
addition, a child’s or teen’s knowledge about advertising or 
sharing personal information online can only serve as a cog-
nitive defense when it is accessed or activated at the time a 
child/teen is viewing an ad or sharing information online (cf. 
Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg 1988; John 1999). 
As an example, to activate knowledge from educational 
films about advertising persuasion, Brucks, Armstrong, and 
Goldberg (1988) used a cueing strategy for children aged 9– 
10 to bolster their cognitive defenses. This cueing strategy 
consisted of a five-item quiz asking children whether television 
commercials make products look larger, work better, seem 
more fun and exciting, make the children cooler/look better, 
and make it hard to remember important things about products. 
They found that over 70% of children’s counterarguments to 
the commercials shown were in the high knowledge-cue pres-
ent condition as opposed to other conditions in which their 
cognitive defenses were not cued. Also, and in general, increas-
ing one’s ability to process and act on knowledge through 
defense strategies is more likely to lead to beliefs and attitudes 
that become internalized, are relatively enduring, are more 
resistant to counter persuasion, and are more likely to lead to 
behavior change (Kelman 1961; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
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In our current study, we offer the following incremental 
contributions to prior cognitive defense research by examining 
(1) effects beyond advertising as extended to information pri-
vacy online; (2) not only children’s and teens’ beliefs, knowl-
edge, and/or attitudes but also their online privacy decisions; 
(3) multiple age categories; (4) multiple cognitive defense stra-
tegies; and (5) and accounting for children’s and teens’ moti-
vation to restrict what they share online. In this study, young 
people’s ability to actively restrict access when sharing their 
private information online is activated by either a short educa-
tional video (“Be A Smart Cookie”) or quiz with elaborated 
feedback based directly on the video. Elaborated feedback 
involves not only providing whether a child/teen answered the 
quiz question correctly but also explaining why (Van der Kleij, 
Feskens, and Eggen 2015). Researchers have found such feed-
back to be more effective on learning outcomes than simple 
statements of whether the answer was correct (Van der Kleij, 
Feskens, and Eggen 2015). Thus, we believe that the quiz with 
feedback will result in greater active learning (e.g., belief 
change) by children and teens about online privacy than the 
video containing the exact same content or nothing at all. 
Motivation and Ability (Age) to Restrict 
Online Information 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model, through its motivation and 
ability to process dimensions, provides a valuable framework to 
examine additional factors that might help a person restrict what 
they share online and the effect of these factors on persuasion 
and related behaviors (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; see also 
Andrews 1987; Andrews and Shimp 1990; 2018; Batra and Ray 
1986; MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991). Our study seeks 
to tap into two of these important precursors to persuasion: 
motivation and ability to restrict one’s online information. 
Motivation to Restrict Online Information 
For children and teens, one’s prior motivation to process and 
act on information can be an important antecedent to persua-
sion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). That is, the personal relevance 
to children and teens as to whether they should take action in 
protecting and restricting their personal information is at issue. 
With greater motivation, they are likely to allocate greater effort 
in thinking about the consequences of sharing private informa-
tion and actively place restrictions on such sharing. Those who 
are more motivated to process and act on their personal infor-
mation are more likely to develop beliefs and attitudes that 
become internalized, are relatively enduring, are more resistant 
to counter persuasion, and that are more likely to lead to beha-
vior change (Kelman 1961; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
The Role of Age in Ability to Process, Learning 
Differences, and Reactance 
An individual’s ability to process and act in restricting and 
protecting their private information online has been discussed 
in terms of closing “knowledge gaps” and improving literacy 
on privacy issues (Trepte et al. 2015). In general, the ability to 
process and act on information is related to one’s knowledge, 
skills, digital literacy, etc. As previously noted, several cogni-
tive defense strategies will be tested to develop and enhance 
children’s and teens’ privacy knowledge gaps and digital lit-
eracy. However, individual differences, such as education, 
intelligence, and cognitive development as young people age 
have been shown to enhance one’s ability to process informa-
tion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
For instance, research on children’s information processing 
is useful for digital literacy efforts (Roedder 1981; Gregan-
Paxton and John 1997) and proposes three stages of cognitive 
development for children to separate central and incidental 
material: limited (under age 8), cued (age 8–12) and strategic 
(over age 12). (Other age categories were proposed by Roedder 
for different activities.) Based on this research, Brucks et al. 
expected that children must reach the strategic processing stage 
(age 13) before they can generate spontaneous cognitive 
responses. Children aged 8–12 would need a defense strategy 
cue or prompt to focus their attention and counterargue. How-
ever, children under age 8 (limited category) were predicted to 
be more challenged than those aged 8-12 in focusing attention 
on the arguments and counterarguing. Brucks, Armstrong, 
and Goldberg (1988) extended this research by showing that 
advertising knowledge did not result in increased counterar-
guments against advertisements for the cued age group (age 
9–10) unless a direct cue was present to activate that knowl-
edge. However, based on research in child development and 
digital activity (discussed subsequently), we believe that reac-
tance and rebellion experienced at this age to follow online 
privacy rules will take precedence in attenuating efforts to 
restrict their sharing of private information in comparison to 
older age groups. 
Early adolescence (e.g., age 8–13) marks a time of serious 
rebellion against parents, safety rules, and restraints, in which 
young people reject their “old child identity” (Pickhardt 2009). 
Such rebellion often goes against their own self-interest in 
supporting their self-esteem and can lead to self-destructive 
and high-risk behaviors. This is only exacerbated with 
increased social media use at this age and can result in negative 
consequences in this venue. Thus, as children age from more 
limited knowledge and ability (e.g., from age 6–7 to 8–12), 
they are likely to exhibit more reactance to rules (Brehm and 
Brehm 1981) and be less motivated to restrict or limit their 
private information online. Such reactance is likely to be atte-
nuated with older children/teens due to their greater autonomy, 
independence, and online experience. Older children/teens (age 
13–15) also should be more “tech savvy” in their online privacy 
protection due to their greater experience with apps, devices, 
and online information, especially as they reach high school. In 
a report for the Digital Trust Foundation, research on middle 
school youth found a “7th grade technology leap” with an 
“overall increase in device use and online activity” between 
ages 12 and 13. At this age, friends tend to play a more impor-
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Figure 2. Conceptual study framework: Children’s online privacy study process and key variables. 
prefers to ask their friends for help about issues online rather 
than ask their parents or teachers (Walker, Kiesler, and Malone 
2016, pp. 22–23). Yet, at times, such independence and/or 
reliance on other young people may result in misinformation 
and overconfidence as children/teens age. 
Research Focus, Incremental Contributions, and 
Conceptual Study Framework 
Thus, our study extends previous cognitive defense research 
by: (1) examining a new application area (children’s informa-
tion privacy), (2) including additional age categories (e.g., lim-
ited, strategic), and (3) testing multiple cognitive defense 
strategies to aid online safety knowledge and the ability to 
place restrictions (conditions) on personal information online. 
We also believe that (4) a child’s or teen’s motivation to 
actively protect their privacy online is an important factor in 
the process. The process of these key variables is presented in 
our conceptual study framework found in Figure 2. 
Study Predictions 
Considering the preceding research, we predict the following: 
H1: The quiz cognitive defense treatment should lead 
children and teens to (a) have more favorable beliefs 
about online safety, (b) place greater importance on 
restricting sharing of the YouTube (YT) video watched, 
and (c) have greater willingness to restrict sharing access 
to the YT video watched than the other cognitive 
defense cue treatments (i.e., video, absence of a cue). 
H2: Children and teens with a higher motivation to 
restrict their access and sharing (in general) will have 
(a) more favorable beliefs about online safety, (b) 
greater understanding of the importance of restricting 
the YT video watched, and (c) greater willingness to 
restrict sharing access to the YT video watched than 
those with a lower motivation to restrict access and 
sharing (in general). 
H3: The strategic (age 13–15) group should (a) have 
more favorable beliefs about online safety, (b) place 
greater importance on restricting sharing of the YT 
video watched, and (c) have greater willingness to 
restrict sharing access to the YT video watched than the 
limited (age 5–6) or cued (age 8–12) groups. 
Method 
Pretests of Cognitive Defense Strategies and Measures 
Prior to the main study, we conducted pretesting to test video 
and quiz content and measures intended to aid the restriction of 
information and videos shared online by children and teens. We 
used a professional marketing research firm with expertise in 
collecting panel data from children and teens to collect the data 
online in the pretest and main study. An email solicitation to 
parent panel members included the survey link, estimated sur-
vey time, and the specific minimal reward compensation (gift 
card points or sweepstakes entry). Panel account information 
was kept separate from general ID numbers for all data 
provided. Following screening for age categories (age 6–7; 
age 8–12; age 13–15), reading ability, parental consent, and 
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child/teen assent, we used a pretest of 146 children and teens 
split evenly across age categories and gender to test the video 
and quiz content. Children/teens were randomly assigned to 
either (1) a 1-minute, 17-second educational video edited from 
“Be a Smart Cookie” from YouthPrivacyProtection.org3 or (2) 
a seven-item true/false educational quiz (“Tips for Online Safe-
ty”; see Appendix A) based directly on information in the 
video. For the quiz, children/teen respondents were then given 
feedback as to whether their answer was correct and why this 
was the case. Pretest results for the quiz ranged from 70.1% to 
97.9% correct for the seven items. The video and quiz manip-
ulations worked as intended, with checks measuring whether 
the video/quiz said, “Every time you go online, a part of your-
self is left behind” (video ¼ 95% correct; quiz ¼ 95% correct) 
and “Third-party shadows follow wherever you click” (video ¼ 
85% correct; quiz ¼ 97% correct). Believability of the quiz and 
video was measured on three seven-point scales (1 ¼ “not 
believable” through 7 ¼ “believable,” 1 ¼ “not credible” 
through 7 ¼ “credible,” and 1¼ “not trustworthy” through 7 
¼ “trustworthy”; avideo ¼ .90; aquiz ¼ .86). Average believ-
ability of the video (x ¼ 5.97 (3.07)) and the quiz (x ¼ 5.97 
(3.63)) were above the scale midpoint (4.0). Also, believability 
did not vary across age categories for the video (F(2,68) ¼ 
.026; p ¼ .975) and quiz (F(2,68) ¼ .045; p ¼ .956). Finally, 
as a check on the processing fluency of both the video and quiz 
(Schwarz 2004), respondents were asked four seven-point ques-
tions (1 ¼ “tough to understand” through 7 ¼ “easy to under-
stand,” 1 ¼ “tough to process” through 7 ¼ “easy to process,” 1 ¼ 
“unorganized” through 7 ¼ “organized,” and 1¼ “unclear” 
through 7 ¼ “clear”; avideo ¼ .93; aquiz ¼ .81). Average process-
ing fluency of the video (x ¼ 6.00 (4.37) and quiz (x ¼ 5.92 
(4.74)) were both above the scale midpoint (4.0). In addition, 
processing fluency did not vary across age categories for the video 
(F(2,68) ¼ 1.64; p ¼ .202) and quiz (F(2,63) ¼ .661; p ¼ .520). 
Main Study: Sample and General Procedure 
The main study consisted of 513 children and teens split evenly 
across the same three key age groups (6–7, 8–12, and 13–15) 
and gender (50.4% female; 49.6% male). The ethnic break-
down was 68.9% Caucasian (not Hispanic), 11.9% Hispanic, 
10.9% African American (not Hispanic), 4.7% Asian Ameri-
can, and 3.6% other ethnicities. The median category reported 
for time spent online was 1–2 hours per day. The same vendor 
and procedures used in collecting pretest data were used in the 
main study. Those participating in the pretest were not part of 
the main study. The children/teens (with parental consent and 
child/teen assent) were recruited and screened for ability to 
read, current availability, presence of a parent or guardian, and 
parental possession of a YouTube account. Following parental 
agreement to the interview, the children/teens were randomly 
assigned to a cognitive defense strategy from the pretest— 
3 Video clip available at https://www.youthprivacyprotection.org/cookie-
video-clip. 
either the video clip on online privacy safety (see link provided 
in footnote 3), the educational quiz on online privacy safety 
(see Appendix A), or nothing at all (i.e., the control). The 
information on online safety presented in both the video and 
educational quiz cues was identical. The main study results for 
the seven-item quiz ranged from 75.2% to 98.2% correct. As in 
the pretest, we used processing checks to make sure participants 
indeed viewed the cognitive defense strategy if they were 
assigned to one (i.e., the online safety video or quiz) and watched 
the YouTube video. For the main study, the video and quiz 
manipulations worked as intended, with checks measuring 
whether the video/quiz said, “Every time you go online, a part 
of yourself is left behind” (video ¼ 90% correct; quiz ¼ 96% 
correct) and “Third-party shadows follow wherever you click” 
(video ¼ 75% correct; quiz ¼ 96% correct). 
Children/teens were later (with parent permission) allowed 
to view an age-appropriate video on YouTube that was first 
selected by a parent. Before viewing the YouTube video, they 
were asked if their parents restricted what they watch on You-
Tube. Parents were then instructed to open their YouTube 
account, find an age-appropriate video for their child/teen to 
watch, and step aside while the child/teen watched it and then 
answered questions. After viewing the video for a maximum of 
one to two minutes, we asked the children/teens filler questions 
regarding what the video was and whether they liked it. A total 
of 90.3% of the children/teens liked the video that was selected 
for them to watch. We then asked the children/teens a key 
question; i.e., whether or not they wanted to share the YouTube 
video. If yes, they were asked about options for restricting who 
they share the video with (e.g., with everyone, only family and 
friends, only parents, no one). We then assessed their beliefs 
regarding the importance of restricting who they might share 
the video with, as well as five specific beliefs about online 
safety that were tailored to the information presented in the 
video and quiz. Finally, we measured parents’ views about 
restricting their own online information and that of their teen/ 
child, as well as the teen’s/child’s online and app usage and 
other demographic information. 
Main Study: Key Independent Variables 
The main study consisted of nine cells in a 3 (cognitive defense 
strategy: video, quiz, or absent [control])  3 (age difference 
category: limited: age 6–7, cued: age 8–12, or strategic: age 
13–15) design. The total sample of 513–with 57 per cell– 
offered an 88% chance of detecting a medium-sized effect 
(e.g., omega-squared of .25) with a 5% estimate of error 
(Cohen 1969, p. 309). We used a median split on motivation 
to restrict online information (in general) to separate child/teen 
respondents into high and low motivation-to-restrict groups. 
This motivation to restrict online information (in general) was 
a mean-centered, summated scale measured with three seven-
point agreement items: “It is important that I restrict what I am 
doing and sharing online,” “I am interested in restricting what I 
am doing and sharing online,” and “I am motivated to restrict 
what I am doing and sharing online” (a ¼ .90). 
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Table 1. Multivariate and Univariate Results: Online Safety Beliefs and Importance of Restricting YouTube Video Watched. 
MANOVA Resultsa Univariate Results 
Partial Online Partial Importance of Partial 
Independent Variables Wilks’ l F-Value Eta-Squared Safety Beliefs Eta-Squared Restricting YT Video Eta-Squared 
Main Effects 
Cognitive defense strategy (CDS) .93 8.40*** .04 15.21*** .06 2.62* .01 
Age category (A) .96 .88 .01 1.34 .01 .51 .00 
Motivation (M) .82 51.04*** .18 91.32*** .16 15.06*** .03 
Interaction effects 
CDS  A .98 .94 .01 .75 .01 1.06 .01 
M  A .99 1.18 .01 1.50 .01 1.94 .01 
CDS  M .99 .07 .00 .02 .00 .11 .00 
a***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10, N ¼ 513. 
Note: Three-way interactions are nonsignificant for both dependent measures. 
Main Study: Dependent Measures and Analysis 
Before the children/teens watched the YouTube video selected 
by their parents, we asked them if their parents restricted what 
they watched on YouTube. Later, after viewing the YouTube 
video, two key categorical dependent variables assessed the 
teen’s/child’s decisions regarding the YouTube video they 
watched. These assessed whether they would (1) share the 
video (“Would you like to share the video with others?”) and, 
if yes, (2) with whom (“Who would you share the video with?”; 
everyone, only family and friends, only parents, no one). The 
importance of the teen/child restricting with whom they might 
share the video was measured on a seven-point scale (1 ¼ “not 
important at all” through 7 ¼ “very important”). Also, five 
specific online privacy beliefs were measured on seven-point 
agreement scales: (1) “When you go online, part of you never 
goes away (e.g., posts, likes, searches),” (2) “Third party ‘sha-
dows’ see what you are doing online,” (3) “Online sites share 
your information with third-party ‘shadows,’” (4) “Third-party 
‘shadows’ give your information to companies that target you 
(e.g., send ads to you),” and (5) “You should keep your per-
sonal information out of the hands of people who don’t know 
you.” We created a mean-centered, summated scale of the 
online safety beliefs (a ¼ .85). 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to 
examine the impact of the independent variables on the online 
safety belief and importance of restricting the YT video mea-
sures. Given overall significance, we performed follow-up 
Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) contrasts in accordance with 
predictions in the hypotheses. Means and standard deviations 
are provided for each treatment group. We used chi-square 
analysis and logistic (logit) regression for the categorical deci-
sion measures. 
Results 
Online Safety Beliefs 
For beliefs about online safety and the importance of restricting 
sharing of the YouTube video, we conducted a MANOVA to 
examine the effects of the cognitive defense strategy treatment, 
age categories, and motivation to restrict the exchange of 
online information (in general). Table 1 displays the overall 
multivariate and univariate findings for the effects of these 
independent variables on the belief and importance measures. 
The means and standard deviations for the independent vari-
ables appear in Table 2. 
H1a predicted that the quiz cognitive defense treatment 
would lead to more favorable beliefs about online safety than 
the other cognitive defense cue treatments (i.e., video and 
absence of a cue). In support of H1a, and as shown in Table 2, 
an SNK contrast indicated that the quiz defense treatment (M ¼ 
6.21) led to significantly greater online safety beliefs than the 
video defense treatment (M ¼ 5.84; p < .05) and the control (M 
¼ 5.46; p < .05). In support of H2a, and as shown in Table 2, 
those children/teens with a higher motivation to restrict sharing 
(M ¼ 6.29) had significantly greater online safety beliefs than 
those with lower motivation levels (M ¼ 5.31; p < .05). As 
indicated in Table 2, the predictions in H3a were supported, as 
the teens aged 13–15 (M ¼ 6.01) had significantly greater 
online safety beliefs than the children aged 8–12 (M ¼ 5.75; 
p < .05) and children aged 6–7 (M ¼ 5.61; p < .05). There 
were no differences between the children aged 5–6 (M ¼ 5.50) 
and the children aged 8–12 (M ¼ 5.54; p > .05). The cognitive 
defense strategy findings were robust in holding within each 
age group and motivation to restrict group. 
Importance of Restricting the Sharing of the Specific 
YouTube Video Watched 
We asked the children and teens about the importance of 
restricting the sharing of the specific YT video they had 
watched. As indicated in Table 2, H1b was supported in part, 
with the quiz cognitive defense treatment (M ¼ 5.04) leading to 
a significantly greater importance of restricting the sharing of 
the YT video watched than the control (M ¼ 4.51, p < .05). 
However, the quiz did not lead to a significantly greater impor-
tance of restricting the YT video watched than the educational 
video (M ¼ 4.75, p > .05). In support of H2b, those with a 
 
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Table 2. Means (and SDs): Effects of Cognitive Defense Strategy 
(CDS), Age (A), and Motivation (M) Conditions on Online Safety 
Beliefs and Importance of Restricting the YT Video. 
Online Safety Importance of 
Beliefs Restricting YT Video 
Cognitive Defense 
Strategy 
Control (a) 5.46 (1.26)b,c 4.51 (2.16)c 
Video (b) 5.84 (1.03)a,c 4.75 (1.97) 
Quiz (c) 6.21 (0.94)a,b 5.04 (2.01)a 
Age Category 
Age 6–7 (a) 5.61 (1.23)c 4.64 (2.16) 
Age 8–12 (b) 5.75 (1.21)c 4.68 (2.02) 
Age 13–15 (c) 6.01 (0.97)a,b 4.90 (2.07) 
Motivation 
Low (a) 5.31 (1.08)b 4.30 (1.81)b 
High (b) 6.29 (1.02)a 5.20 (2.24)a 
Note: Comparisons are made going down a column. Superscripts adjacent to 
the means for a given column in the table indicate significant differences (p 
.05 or better) according to SNK contrasts based on predictions. For example, 
for the online safety beliefs column and comparing cognitive defense strategy 
treatments, the superscript for the “c” cell (quiz) indicates that the online 
safety belief mean is significantly greater than the means for both the control 
cell labeled “a” and the video cell labeled “b.” 
higher motivation to restrict access and sharing in general (M ¼ 
5.20) gave a significantly higher importance to restricting the 
sharing of the specific YT video they watched than those with a 
lower motivation to restrict access and sharing in general (M ¼ 
4.30, p < .05). Finally, although in the predicted direction, yet 
not supporting H3b, teens age 13–15 (M ¼ 4.90) did not place a 
significantly greater importance on restricting sharing of the 
YT video they watched than children age 8–12 (M ¼ 4.68) or 
age 6–7 (M ¼ 4.64, p >.05). 
Sharing the YouTube Video watched 
Children/teens were asked if (1) they would share the YouTube 
video they watched and, if yes, (2) with whom. This first deci-
sion question was used to test predicted relationships in H1c 
through H3c. Regarding sharing the YT video, a chi-square  
analysis revealed a significant relationship between agreeing 
to share the YT video watched and the cognitive defense con-
dition (w 2 (2) ¼ 6.921, p < .05; control ¼ 84%, quiz ¼ 75%, 
video ¼ 72%). We then conducted logistic regression to exam-
ine the specific effects of each cognitive defense condition (vs. 
the control) on children’s/teens’ willingness to share the YT 
video. In partial support of H1c, the children/teens in the control 
condition were significantly more likely to be willing to share 
the YT video they watched than those in the quiz condition 
(84% vs. 75%, odds ratio [OR] ¼ 1.755, p < .05, [95% CI, 
1.02–3.02] and those in the video condition (84% vs. 72%, 
OR ¼ 2.016, p < .05, [95% CI, 1.15–3.55]). However, there were 
no differences between those in the quiz (75%) versus video 
(72%) conditions (OR ¼ 1.15, p > .05, [95% CI, .66–2.01]). 
Those who were higher in motivation to restrict sharing (in 
general) were found not to differ in willingness to share the YT 
video (76.7%) from those who were lower in motivation to 
restrict access and sharing (in general) (78.8%; (w 2 (1) ¼ 
.286, p ¼ .59). A logistic regression did not support the 
prediction in H2c of a positive relationship between motivation 
to restrict sharing (in general) with the teen’s/child’s 
willingness not to share the YT video (OR ¼ 1.13, p ¼ .593, 
[95% CI, .72–1.77]. 
For age, a chi-square analysis indicated that the children age 
8–12 had greater willingness to share the YT video they 
watched (81.8%) than the teens aged 13–15 (72.3%) and the 
children age 6–7 (79.9%), although an overall chi-square test 
did not reach significance (w 2 (2) ¼ 4.31, p ¼ .12). Individual 
logistic regressions first revealed support for H3c, as the stra-
tegic age group of teens age 13–15 were significantly less 
likely to share the YT video they watched (72.3%) than the 
cued age group of children age 8–12 (81.8%; OR  ¼ 1.717, p < 
.05, [95% CI, .99–2.98]). However, although in the predicted 
direction, the teens age 13–15 were not significantly less likely 
to share the YT video they watched (72.3%) than the limited 
age group of children age 6–7 (79.9%; OR  ¼ .418, p ¼ .131, 
[95% CI, .88–2.62]). 
Setting Boundaries for Sharing (Restricting the Audience) 
Those willing to share the YT video they watched were then 
asked who they were willing to share the YT video with (e.g., 
everyone, only friends and family, no one). In an examination 
of the cognitive defense strategy, a chi-square analysis indi-
cated that those in the quiz condition were more likely to share 
the YT video watched with everyone (44.8%) than those in the 
control (38.3%) or those exposed to the video (30.0%), 
although an overall chi-square test did not reach significance 
(w 2 (2) ¼ 4.16, p ¼ .12). A logistic regression revealed that the 
children/teens in the quiz condition were significantly more 
likely to be willing to share the YT video they watched with 
everyone (45.4%) than those in the video condition (30.0%; 
OR ¼ 1.891, p < .05, [95% CI, 1.02–3.49]). However, there 
were no differences in the likelihood of sharing with everyone 
between the control (38.3%) and quiz conditions (44.8%; 
OR ¼ .77, p ¼ .30, [95% CI, .46–1.27]) and between the 
control (38.3%) and video conditions (30.0%; OR  ¼ 1.449, 
p ¼ .20, [95% CI, .81–2.58]). 
Although both percentages were lower, those who were 
higher in motivation to restrict their sharing (in general) were 
found (somewhat surprisingly) to have a greater willingness to 
share the YT video with everyone (46.0%) versus those who 
were lower in motivation to restrict sharing (in general) 
(31.5%; w 2 (1) ¼ 7.52, p < .05). This counterintuitive result 
may be due to overconfidence on the part of youth in handling 
online safety themselves and through their network of friends. 
A logistic regression indicated that those with higher motiva-
tion to restrict sharing (in general) were more willing to share 
the YT video with everyone (46%) versus those with low moti-
vation (31.5%) (OR  ¼ .54, p < .05, [95% CI, .35–.77]). 
Finally, the percentage of those who were willing to share 
the YT video they watched with everyone increased with age, 
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with 6- to 7-year-olds at 31.9%, 8- to 12-year-olds at 36.7%, 
and 13- to 15-year-olds at 47.2% (w 2 (2) ¼ 5.65, p ¼ .059). A 
set of logistic regressions indicated that although there were 
no differences between those aged 6–7 and 8–12 (OR ¼ 1.24, 
p ¼ .44, [95% CI, .72–2.13] and those aged 8–12 and 13–15 
(OR ¼ 1.54, p ¼ .11, [95% CI, .91–2.63], the willingness to 
share the YT video watched with everyone was significantly 
higher for those aged 13–15 (47.2%) than for those aged 6–7 
(31.9%) (OR  ¼ 1.91, p < .05, [95% CI, 1.10–3.31]. Again, 
similar to motivation, this result may be due to overconfi-
dence on the part of older youth in handling online safety 
themselves and through their network of friends. 
Effects of Parental Restrictions on YouTube 
Before the children/teens watched the YouTube video, they 
were asked if their parents restricted what they watched on 
YouTube. Although not predicted, we sought to examine if this 
measure would interact with the age categories in its effect on 
online safety beliefs and the perceived importance of restricting 
the sharing of the YouTube video watched. In the case of 
children/teens saying that their parents restricted what they 
watched on YouTube, there was an overall effect of age (F ¼ 
3.90, p < .05), with SNK contrasts revealing that the teens aged 
13–15 (M ¼ 6.05; SD ¼ 1.03) had significantly more favorable 
online safety beliefs than the children aged 6–7 (M ¼ 5.53; SD 
¼ 1.24; p < .05). There were no differences for the teens aged 
13–15 versus the children aged 8–12 (M ¼ 5.77; SD ¼ 1.27) or 
among the age categories in the case of parents not restricting 
what their children watched on YouTube. (In the latter case, the 
children aged 6–7 had more favorable online safety beliefs, but 
these were not significant versus other age categories.) 
A similar pattern emerged for the importance of restricting 
sharing of the YouTube video watched. For children/teens 
indicating that their parents restricted what they watched on 
YouTube, there was an effect of age (F ¼ 2.76, p < .10), with 
SNK contrasts revealing that the teens aged 13–15 (M ¼ 5.29; 
SD ¼ 2.08) placed significantly greater importance on restrict-
ing the sharing of the YouTube video they watched than the 
children aged 6–7 (M ¼ 4.55; SD ¼ 2.19; p < .10). There were 
no differences for teens aged 13–15 versus children age 8–12 
(M ¼ 4.82; SD ¼ 2.06) or among the age categories in the case 
of parents who did not restrict what their children watched on 
YouTube. Again, in the latter case, the children aged 6–7 
placed greater importance on restricting the YouTube video 
they watched, but this was not significant versus other age 
categories. Overall, it appears that the oldest age category 
(i.e., the strategic age group, those teens aged 13–15) can be 
(positively) affected by perceived parental restrictions that 
have an impact on teens’ online safety beliefs and the impor-
tance of restricting the sharing of online videos watched. 
Discussion 
Overall, our results suggest that it is possible to empower chil-
dren to protect what information (e.g., videos) they share on 
social media sites such as You Tube. Our findings depend on 
the type of cognitive defense strategy employed (quiz with 
feedback, educational video, or absence of a strategy), the age 
group of the child (strategic, cued, and limited), their motiva-
tion to restrict sharing in general, and perceived parental 
restrictions on viewing. We now summarize and discuss our 
key findings. 
Online Safety Beliefs 
Based on the cognitive defense strategies we tested experimen-
tally, (1) the quiz with feedback was more effective than the 
educational video and (2) the video was better than the control 
in influencing online safety beliefs. The strategic age group 
(aged 13–15) was more likely than the cued age group (aged 
8–12) to have a more favorable change in their online safety 
beliefs for greater protection. We also found that those children 
with a higher motivation to restrict sharing (in general) had a 
more favorable change in their online safety beliefs than those 
with a lower motivation to restrict sharing (in general). 
Sharing Decisions 
Our results indicate that the quiz with feedback and educa-
tional video conditions were significantly better in restricting 
sharing than the control condition. This is important given 
the relatively high percentage of children/teens willing to 
share the YouTube video they watched, ranging from 72% 
(video) to 75% (quiz) to 84% (control). The video was better 
than the quiz when the children chose to restrict the audience 
for sharing, with more in the quiz (44.8%) selecting “with 
everyone” compared to the video (30.0%). We believe that 
the importance of setting audience boundary restrictions 
when sharing was communicated more vividly with the video 
depiction of mice taking and storing the child’s cookie 
crumbs (an analogy to their online information) compared 
to the quiz with feedback. 
Also, it appears that some overconfidence was displayed by 
those who agree with the importance of restricting sharing and 
for the older children/teens (aged 13–15) that had a greater 
willingness to share the video with everyone. For this strategic 
age category, it may be that their experience with digital 
devices and online access to information has fostered a greater 
focus, learning, and retention of the relevance of privacy issues 
(Maccoby and Hagen 1965). Such improvement in one’s ability 
to understand and process key information is an important 
precursor to persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). As noted 
above, this finding also may be a result of overconfidence on 
the part of motivated and/or older youth in handling online 
safety themselves and through their network of friends. So, 
even though the quiz and video were effective in enabling 
protective cognitive defenses (i.e., setting boundaries on shar-
ing), there is still ample room for development and improve-
ment in the type and utilization of strategies employed. 
11 Andrews et al. 
Parental Restrictions 
Our results indicate that perceived parental monitoring of chil-
dren’s online use can be helpful in some situations. For exam-
ple, the child’s/teen’s perception of their parents restricting 
their YouTube viewing positively affected their online safety 
beliefs and the importance of restricting videos shared for the 
strategic age group (aged 13–15) versus the limited age group 
(aged 6–7). Such perception of parental monitoring of online 
behaviors may help over time, with such monitoring operating 
as a shared learning experience as opposed to a fear of punish-
ment on behalf of children and teens. 
Policy Implications 
Our study aids regulatory and self-regulatory efforts for enhan-
cing children’s digital literacy and their cognitive defenses in 
setting boundaries for what they share online. In a broader 
sense, this includes efforts to empower children to restrict 
access to their personal information. For many years, federal 
(e.g., FTC), state (e.g., California), and self-regulatory agencies 
(e.g., Advertising Self-Regulatory Council’s CARU), as well 
as companies that have websites and provide online services, 
have struggled with efforts to protect children and their per-
sonal information online. Even as COPPA celebrates 20 years 
of existence, challenges with ensuring verifiable parental con-
sent and keeping up with emerging technology continue to 
exist. The FTC’s goals of not only COPPA enforcement, but 
also encouraging self-regulatory efforts with industry to 
“streamline COPPA compliance,” has led to a six-step plan for 
several approved Safe Harbor Programs (Magee 2018). The 
overall purpose of this FTC-driven plan is to guide companies 
through the process of protecting children online (Magee 
2018). However, these efforts still focus on parental consent 
and protecting/controlling the access to information gathered 
by companies about and from children online. Our findings 
indicate that using cognitive defense strategies, such as a sim-
ple quiz with feedback or an educational video, can help 
empower children to protect themselves online. 
In our study, we examined whether digital literacy knowl-
edge was important for online safety and found that the quiz 
(with elaborated feedback) was more helpful for positively 
affecting children’s and teens’ online safety beliefs. With this 
in mind, federal agency privacy guidelines could be offered to 
nudge companies to expand online safety quizzes with feed-
back for children/teens to build their online safety/privacy 
knowledge and beliefs. Currently, a self-regulatory effort 
among leading advertising organizations (“Privacy for 
America”) is focusing on data protection solutions, but it is not 
yet addressing children’s privacy knowledge specifically at this 
point (AAAA 2019). 
When sharing decisions were the focus, especially regarding 
restricting the sharing audience, the educational video was 
more useful. Thus, guidelines also could promote the use of 
online privacy videos aimed at children’s/teens’ online deci-
sion making (e.g., https://www.youthprivacyprotection.org 
funded by the Digital Trust Foundation). Importantly, such 
videos should be accessible at the same point at which chil-
dren/teens consider sharing personal information online (e.g., 
within an app on a smartphone). However, it should be noted 
that both the quiz and video were better than the control con-
dition (in which no cognitive defense strategy was provided) in 
improving knowledge and decision making. Also, such expan-
sion efforts with quizzes and videos should be tested using a 
sample of children/teens. Other direct educational efforts could 
be made through the FTC’s consumer website (https://www. 
consumer.ftc.gov/topics/protecting-kids-online), its annual Pri-
vacy Con, and its Division of Privacy & Identity Protection. 
Similar educational efforts at nonprofits (e.g., Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center) could help children’s and teen’s 
online privacy knowledge and decision making. 
Certainly, over the past several years, there have been many 
important and well-funded educational campaigns at the fed-
eral level aimed at adolescents (e.g., the FDA’s The Real Cost 
Campaign, the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign). 
However, to our knowledge, such national campaigns do not 
yet exist for online privacy safety and are desperately needed. 
This is especially the case considering recent and significant 
COPPA violations (FTC 2019; U.S. v. Muscial.ly and Musi-
cal.ly, Inc. 2019; U.S. and the Attorney General of the State of 
NY v. Google LLC and YouTube LLC 2019). Considering the 
Google YouTube decision, one dissenting FTC commissioner 
argued for a technological “backstop” solution whereby 
YouTube algorithms would help identify child-oriented con-
tent upfront and prevent behavioral advertising, rather than 
relying on the self-identification by YouTube  channel crea-
tors outlined in the settlement (Slaughter 2019). However, 
given the millions of YouTube child channels, such a promis-
ing technological approach might be best combined with 
enhancing children and teens’ cognitive defense education 
before such encounters arise. 
Our study also suggests slightly different (and positive) 
effects of cognitive defense education depending on whether 
such knowledge and/or sharing decisions are important. How-
ever, there is no doubt that challenges remain, as overconfi-
dence seems to accrue with increases in one’s motivation to 
restrict their sharing and especially with age. On a positive 
note, perceived parental involvement and cognitive defense 
strategies can have an impact even for the oldest, strategic 
youth categories. Thus, a combination of educational defense 
strategies similar to those tested in the current study, along with 
an active role by parents, may be helpful in empowering chil-
dren and teens to internalize online safety beliefs, be more 
judicious, and utilize active privacy protective strategies when 
sharing their information online. 
Future Research 
Because our study focused solely on enhancing children’s and 
teens’ ability (empowering them) to protect their information 
online through cognitive defense strategies, as well as account-
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age categories (strategic, cued, and limited), there are many 
other areas of research that are warranted. For example, chil-
dren’s and teen’s opportunity to restrict/share information 
online could be studied by varying the amount of time it takes 
to read privacy policies, or by studying the effects of whether 
children/teens are free/not free from distractions (e.g., friends’ 
encouragement to share information; pressuring app down-
loads). Paying attention to such details that might affect 
restricting access should be considered as part of digital lit-
eracy efforts by federal, state, and self-regulatory agencies. 
In addition, the endurance of the online safety beliefs could 
be tested longitudinally based on different degrees of motiva-
tion or ability to restrict information. No doubt, different types 
of educational quiz and video approaches and more tailored age 
measures for children/teens could be studied in the future. Also, 
would older teens (e.g., aged 16–18) respond in the same fash-
ion as the younger age groups? Other individual characteristics 
for children/teens could be examined, such as gender effects in 
online risk taking. For example, will male youth be more 
inclined to take risks online regarding their private information 
than female youth? In addition, as noted previously, there is a 
real need to develop a national education campaign to enhance 
and empower children and teens to protect their online privacy. 
Also, would external or peripheral cues (e.g., social media 
influencers) be effective in influencing online safety beliefs 
and decisions to restrict online information sharing? In addi-
tion, although some efforts have been made to develop general 
digital literacy scales (cf. Trepte et al. 2015), work is needed on 
measures of digital literacy for youth. Another research avenue 
may deal with how to address overconfidence in online privacy 
protection, especially for those who might be over-reliant on 
their motivation, abilities, network of friends, and/or parents to 
handle their privacy protection. Finally, convenient access to 
websites, platforms, and applications by children (not just sites 
focused on children or advertising to children) must be 
addressed to understand how to encourage active protection 
strategies and parental monitoring behaviors. For example, will 
such cognitive defenses and digital literacy work in the context 
of popular gaming app chat rooms (Jargon 2019)? Such 
research would be welcomed in helping to rebalance informa-
tion power for children and teens online, and to empower chil-
dren to internalize the importance of online safety and actively 
restricting what they share online. 
Appendix A 
“Tips for Online Safety” Quiz 
Please answer the following questions by marking either 
“true” or “false” to the best of your knowledge about online 
safety issues. 





Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that every time you 
go online, a part of yourself is left behind. 
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It 
is actually TRUE that every time you go online, a part of 
yourself is left behind. 
The correct answer is TRUE. Every time you go online, a 
part of yourself is left behind. 
2. True or False? Your posts, likes, and shares will go away— 




Response if correct: Correct! It is FALSE that your posts, 
likes, and shares will go away - they never stick. 
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It 
is actually FALSE because your posts, likes, and shares DO 
NOT go away - they DO stick. 
The correct answer is FALSE. Your posts, likes, and shares 
DO NOT go away they DO stick. 




Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that third-party 
shadows follow wherever you click. 
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It 
is actually TRUE that third-party shadows follow wherever 
you click. 
The correct answer is TRUE. Third-party shadows follow 
wherever you click. 
4. True or False? When you log onto a website, that company 





Response if correct: Correct! It is FALSE that when you log 
onto a website, that company never shares your information 
with third parties through secret communication. 
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one 
wrong. It is actually FALSE because when you log on 
to a website, that company sometimes DOES share 
your information with third parties through secret 
communication. 
The correct answer is FALSE. When you log onto a website, 
that company sometimes DOES share your information with 
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5. True or False? Third parties are companies that take your 





Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that third parties 
are companies that take your online information and share it 
with other companies often for money. 
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It 
is actually TRUE that third parties are companies that take 
your online information and share it with other companies 
often for money. 
The correct answer is TRUE. Third parties are companies 
that take your online information and share it with other 
companies often for money. 
6. True or False? As you give away personal information, these 




Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that as you give 
away personal information, these companies send you ads 
that you may or may not wish to see. 
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It is 
actually TRUE that as you give away personal information, these 
companies send you ads that you may or may not wish to see. 
The correct answer is TRUE. As you give away personal 
information, these companies send you ads that you may or 
may not wish to see. 
7. True or False? Giving companies and third parties your 
personal information will help your online experience be as 




Response if correct: Correct! It is FALSE that giving com-
panies and third parties your personal information will help 
your online experience be as secure as it can be. 
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It 
is actually FALSE because giving companies and third par-
ties your personal information will actually REDUCE the 
security of your online experience. 
The answer is FALSE. Giving companies and third parties 
your personal information will actually REDUCE the secu-
rity of your online experience. 
Great job! You completed the quiz. Now we just want to ask 
you a few questions about the quiz you just took. 
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